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If the title of this article had referred to the twenty-firstcentury, rather than the nineteenth, the question itasks could be easily answered. The twenty-first century
law of defamation is clearly a law of the press: it is taught
almost exclusively in courses on media law, for instance,
and all the cases seem to be against media, predominantly
newspaper, defendants. At a more fundamental level, the
content of the current law is strongly influenced by judges’
perceptions of the press. To take one prominent instance,
the emergence of a defence for the publication of matter of
public interest has made express use of a standard of
“responsible journalism” (see Reynolds v Times Newspapers
Limited [2001] 2 AC 127). Similarly, the House of Lords in
the recent case of Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe Sprl
[2007] 1 AC 359 stated that an editor’s assessment of the
quality of the information published, and its importance,
should be given weight. This deference to existing
journalistic standards and practice makes defamation not
only a law relating to the press, but, more controversially, a
law partly created by the press.
The nineteenth century relationship between the law
and the press is, on the face of it, very different. As a
matter of classification, throughout the century defamation
was seen as part of the law of tort. Only in the 1890s do we
start to see works such as Fisher and Strahan’s excellent
The Law of the Press (First edition London, 1891; second
edition London, 1898) attempting to place defamation in
a newspaper law context. Similarly, press defendants had
nothing like the monopoly on litigation of today’s media
corporations. More fundamentally, key developments in
the law occurred in cases having no press connections at
all. Thus, the split into libel and slander came about in
Thorley v Lord Kerry (1812) 4 Taunt 355, a case over a
defamatory letter. Qualified privilege was created in
Toogood v Spyring (1834) 1 CM&R 181 following a master’s
public criticism of a servant. And the fragmentation of
malice in Bromage v Prosser (1825) 4 B&C 247, arguably the
most important development in defamation in that, or any
other century, arose out of a conversation between one
bank customer and another.
We must also recognise, of course, that although the law
of defamation affected the press, it provided a very limited
way of regulating only one aspect of newspaper activity.
Other matters such as contempt of court, and the
infringement of intellectual property rights had to be dealt
with by other bodies of law. Defamation could only ever be
“a” law of the press, not “the” law. And we must also
recognise that there were (and still are) some big gaps,
where there was no legal mechanism to deter very dubious
practices. Perhaps the most vivid exposure of these gaps is
provided by Anthony Trollope, in his novel The Way We Live
Now (1875). As part of the novel’s general theme of the
corruption and dishonesty of 1870s society, the author
turned his attention to the unscrupulousness of the press.
Thus, the novel opens with Lady Carbury, a hack authoress,
writing to three newspaper editors to solicit undeservedly
favourable reviews of her latest mediocre book. She is
partly successful. Later on, when Melmotte, the novel’s
menacing villain, is put forward as a Conservative
candidate for Westminster, Trollope has one of his fictional
newspapers, “The Morning Breakfast Table” lavish
extravagant praise on him.
Trollope goes on to comment that:
they who are concerned in the manufacture of newspapers are
well aware that censure is infinitely more attractive than
eulogy, – but they are quite as well aware that it is more
dangerous. No proprietor or editor was ever brought before the
courts at the cost of ever so many hundred pounds, – which if
things go badly may rise to several thousands, – because he
had attributed all but divinity to some very poor specimen of
mortality. No man was ever called upon for damages because
he had attributed grand motives. It might be well for politics
and literature and art, – and for truth in general, if it was
possible to do so. But a new law of libel must be enacted
before such salutary proceedings can take place (A Trollope,
The Way We Live Now (Oxford University Press, 1982)
Book 1, Chapter XLIV at 415-16).
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As a matter of legal analysis, Trollope was, of course,
correct. Anyone negatively affected by praise of another
might conceivably have had a claim for malicious
falsehood, but the requirements of that tort – including
proof of malice and of damage – would in practice have
prevented any remedy being obtained. But, as Trollope
suggests, manufactured praise had the same tendency to
mislead and corrupt as manufactured criticism: in the
novel, Melmotte wins the election.
So, when we consider the nineteenth century
relationship between defamation and the press, we must
bear in mind that we are considering only the interaction
of selected aspects of both subjects. But, though the
influence of the press on defamation was less all-pervasive
than it is today, it was, I shall argue, of some importance
throughout the century, and its influence increased as the
century wore on. But the form of that influence, and its
effects, fluctuated, and occasionally backfired. In order to
assess that influence more closely we must now distinguish
between legislation and common law.
LEGISLATION
Right from the start of the century, legislators were clear
that the law of defamation should be seen in the context of
the press. Thus, for instance, following the division of the
tort into libel and slander by the Court of Common Pleas
in 1812, Brougham began a Parliamentary campaign to
assimilate slander to libel (For details see P Mitchell, “The
Foundations of Australian Defamation Law” (2006) 28
Sydney Law Review 477). Though his proposal would not be
limited to the press, indeed it would have no effect on the
press at all (which would remain governed by the stricter
rules of libel), the measure was included in a Bill “for
securing the Liberty of the Press and preventing the abuse
thereof ”. Brougham’s Bill failed, and it was succeeded by a
series of equally unsuccessful attempts to effect reform.
Those later Bills also raised the question of limiting the
defence of justification to situations where publication of
the matter was for “the public benefit”. One of the most
striking themes in these debates and proposals was the
prominence given to the press. Thus, for instance, Daniel
O’Connell, a former journalist himself, opposed the
assimilation of slander to libel. Rather, he argued, the
assimilation should be the other way, because the
categories of slander were fixed, and the press should be
able to predict with confidence what would or would not
incur liability (Comerford, “O’Connell, Daniel (1775-
1847)” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford
University Press, 2004 online edn). A Select Committee
appointed in 1834 was instructed to consider the effect of
the law of defamation on the press. The committee never
reported, but the 1843 committee, chaired by Lord
Campbell (himself a former journalist, though he had been
careful to hide the fact) heard extensive evidence about
how the law affected the press.
No evidence was given to the committee by O’Connell –
previously calling Lord Campbell “a tool of the base and
bloody Whigs” had not ingratiated him with the chairman
(see G Jones and V Jones, “Campbell, John first Baron
Campbell of St Andrews (1779-1861)”Oxford Dictionary of
National Biography (Oxford University Press, 2004, online
edn). O’Connell’s absence was rather a pity because, as it
turned out, he was going further, and demanding more,
than the newspaper editors themselves. For instance,
Stanley Lees Giffard, the editor of the Standard newspaper,
stated that his “First Objection” to the current law was that
“you have no power of negativing the Imputation of legal
Malice on the Trial” (see Report from the Select Committee of
the House of Lords appointed to consider the Law of Defamation
and Libel, July 1843 for this and subsequent statements).
He went on to say that truth should not be a complete
defence; rather, truth should be admitted only as evidence
on the issue of malice. Furthermore, he was sceptical of
the value of a public benefit test, commenting that he was
“an Infidel about the Care of the public Good which is
manifested in Libels.”
The editor of the Examiner showed a similar lack of self-
interest. He, too, would have altered the rule that truth
was a complete defence, preferring instead that the truth
should be received by the jury “for as much as it is worth.”
Again, he saw the question of truth as subordinate to the
question of malice. A different approach was advocated by
Johnson Gedge, the Secretary to the Society of Provincial
Newspaper Proprietors. He argued that criminal libel and
civil libel should rest on different principles: criminal libel
should be based on malice, whilst civil libel should turn on
“Injury proved or reasonably to be inferred.” Yet another
suggestion came from John Robertson, the editor of the
London and Westminster Review, who said:
Let all Forms of Law open a clear Path to going before a Jury
to ascertain whether the Fact published was true; and, in the
second place, whether if it was true the Publication of it was
justifiable.
An important factor in answering the second question,
he said, was “whether the Writer was an anonymous
Writer, or whether he, like a Man discharging a public
Duty, and doing what was right, put his name, or his
understood literary Signature, to what he said”.
Several points can be made about the range of views put
before the Select Committee. First is the sheer divergence
of views: clearly we cannot say that there was a (unified)
press view about what the law should be, or how it was
defective. Second, we should note the lack of self-interest:
none of the editors or proprietors were prepared to
endorse O’Connell’s proposal to limit the range of
actionable defamatory words to those in the slander
categories. And all of the editors suggested abolishing truth
as a complete defence, which was obviously against their
interests. Third, there was no emphasis on certainty, or the
avoidance of litigation. All the proposals for reform made28
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by press interests to the Select Committee involved the
application of very general tests: thus, the editor of the
Standard proposed that juries should be directed to weigh
up “the balance of malice”; the Secretary of the Society of
Provincial Newspaper Proprietors suggested “injury
proved, or reasonably to be inferred.” Both were formulae
that almost guaranteed lengthy litigation; in both form and
in content, these were exactly the kind of principles that
later press representatives would regard as intolerably
unjust and unpredictable.
That the newspaper editors and proprietors did so little
to protect their own position in their evidence to the 1843
committee is surprising, and puzzling. We can only guess,
but it may be that there is a clue to the mystery in the
evidence of John Robertson, the editor of the London and
Westminster Review. Towards the end of his evidence,
Robertson seemed to veer off the subject of libel when he
said that “the Recognition of Authors as a distinct Body
and Profession of Importance would tend to create a
higher moral Tone among them.” The perceived low status
of authors was not exactly a novel sentiment, but
Robertson’s expression of it in the context of libel reform
may explain the attitude adopted by his fellow editors. (For
its important background role in a different legal arena see
Charles Mitchell and Charlotte Mitchell, “Planché v Colburn
(1831)” in C Mitchell and P Mitchell (ed), Landmark Cases
in the Law of Restitution (Oxford, 2006) 65.
They perhaps wanted to demonstrate to the committee
that they belonged to a respectable profession, which
operated by the highest moral standards; and they were so
confident in these high standards that they wanted them
embodied in the law of libel. If this is right, the recurrent
emphasis on malice in the editors’ evidence becomes easier
to understand: effectively they were saying – as an
honourable profession, we are content to be judged by our
motives. In other words, they wanted the rules of libel by
which they were governed to reflect the status to which
their profession aspired.
The 1843 committee proposed that slander should be
assimilated to libel, and that justification should only be a
defence where the matter was published for the public
benefit. Ultimately these proposals came to nothing,
although it is interesting to note that they were
implemented in New South Wales. There much legislative
emphasis was placed on the effect of limiting the defence
of truth to matters of public benefit. In particular, the
legislators hoped to curb the output of scurrilous
newspapers, such as the recently defunct Satirist (see Sydney
Morning Herald, June 10, 1846 at 3, col 3).
These early legislative initiatives show the close attention
paid by Parliament to the effect of defamation on the press.
But the content of the proposals also showed that the press
was not going to get everything its own way: the 1843 Bill,
as implemented in New South Wales in 1847, did not give
effect to any of the views of the newspaper editors and
proprietors who had given evidence to the Select
Committee. The public benefit test in relation to truth, for
instance, limited what could be published, and made it
hard to predict what was permissible. The editor of the
Sydney Morning Herald, who had to contend with these
difficulties once Lord Campbell’s proposals had been
adopted in New South Wales, commented in his
newspaper that the statute created “a perpetually varying
Court of Conscience in the jury-box.”
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, however, the
press influence in Parliament was becoming more
powerful, and this increased influence was reflected in
statutory reforms of libel law. Most important, for our
purposes, are the Newspaper Libel and Registration Act of
1881 and the Law of Libel Amendment Act of 1888. Both
statutes dealt with liability for reports of public meetings, a
subject of obvious importance to the press. The common
law position at the time was, interestingly, not so much
opposed to such reports as uncertain. Until 1876 it had
been consistently held that such reports were not
protected, but in that year the Divisional Court had held,
in Purcell v Sowler (1876) 1 CPD 781, that such reports
would be protected if they related to both an individual and
a subject-matter of national importance. The conduct of
the medical officer of the Altrincham poor-law union failed
both criteria.
In the Court of Appeal ((1877) 2 CPD 215), however,
Cockburn CJ had taken a different approach. In his view,
national importance of either person or subject-matter was
not necessary – public interest sufficed. But the Court of
Appeal held, on the facts, that accusations of the kind made
at the meeting should not have been reported before the
claimant had an opportunity to respond to them, and for
that reason there could be no defence for the newspaper.
The stage seemed set for judicial exploration of the factors
that would give rise to a defence.
The 1881 Act, introduced by Hutchinson, a newspaper
proprietor, curtailed any such common law development:
it created qualified privilege for reports of public meetings
in newspapers where publication of the report was for the
public benefit. The Act seemed to have resolved the
problem, and generated only one reported case. In 1888,
however, Parliament was persuaded to revisit the question,
although not without protests from some Members that
the new Bill was “promoted by a little knot of interested
newspaper proprietors” (Hansard’s Parliamentary
Debates, 3rd Series, vol 329 col 1552 (August 3, 1888)).
In fact, the extent of press influence on the 1888 Act is
quite extraordinary. In the House of Commons it was
promoted by Sir Algernon Borthwick, Wilfrid Lawson and
Charles Cameron. Borthwick was the proprietor of the
Morning Post and President of the Press Newspaper Fund.
Lawson was to go on to become the managing proprietor
of the Daily Telegraph and Chairman of the Newspaper
Proprietors Association. Cameron was the son of a 29
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newspaper proprietor, and the former editor of the North
British Daily Mail.
More strikingly, the House of Lords made amendments
to the Bill at the suggestion of the National Association of
Journalists. The Bill was said by one approving peer to
reflect “what the journalists wanted” (Hansard’s
Parliamentary Debates, 3rd Series vol 329 col 1388
(August 3, 1888)). It is difficult to imagine the same
announcement from a similar source today. What the
journalists wanted, it turned out, was a list of meetings the
reporting of which would give rise to a defence. That was
basically what they got, although with the additional
requirement of a public benefit test, which the Act’s
promoters had been opposed to. Today protection for
reports of public meetings is set out in a very similar form,
in the Defamation Act 1996.
What is particularly interesting about these two statutes
is that the 1881 Act was considered so inadequate by the
press, that a new Act, in such different terms was needed.
On the face of it, the 1881 Act seemed to deliver
everything that was required, but the problem was that it
was expressed in terms of broad principle, rather than
specific instances. Thus, there was scope for debate about
what, exactly, made a public meeting public. There was also
scope for debate about whether the report in general or the
defamatory allegation in particular had to satisfy the public
benefit test. In reality there was nothing to choose
between the coverage of the 1881 Act and its 1888
successor from a legal analytical point of view, but the point
seems to have been that the press did not want to embroil
itself in legal analysis. Editors wanted to know what they
could publish, not what the general principles were that
governed the issue.
The point is perhaps best illustrated by the approach to
defamation taken in the classic journalism primer written
by A Baker and E Cope, Pitman’s Practical Journalism and
Newspaper Law (London, 1915). Lawyers traditionally
expect any exposition of a tort to begin with the general
rules of liability, then set out defences, and conclude with
remedies. But in Pitman, the treatment of defamation
begins with “Privileged Reports”, a starting point which
would be considered at best eccentric in a legal text. It sets
out in some detail the position on reports of Parliamentary
proceedings, extracts from Parliamentary papers, reports
of judicial proceedings, coroners’ inquests, local authority
meetings, and public meetings. The general principles of
defamation – the hatred, ridicule and contempt test, etc,
get 10 lines at the end of the chapter. Clearly journalists
and lawyers had very different perceptions both about how
the law worked, and how it ought to be reformed.
COMMON LAW
I turn now to the common law. The overt control and
design of legislation by press interests in the nineteenth
century contrasts with the common law development of
defamation in the same period. Of course, we would not
expect to see factions of judges overtly supporting press
interests, and other factions overtly opposing them. Nor
does there seem to be any sign of covert factions, in for
instance, split decisions, or courts disagreeing with each
other. Indeed, at the start of the nineteenth century there
seems to have been considerable judicial sympathy for the
press, and recognition that it performed an important role.
But this judicial sympathy could not, of course, be
converted into overtly changing the law. Any alteration in
the common law that was favourable to the press would
have to be made by way of the traditional common law
techniques of invoking established principles and reasoning
by analogy.
Both the sympathy and the common law innovations to
which it gave rise, are well illustrated in the emergence of
the defence of fair comment in cases such as Tabart v Tipper
(1808) 1 Camp 350 and Carr v Hood (1808) 1 Camp 355
at the start of the nineteenth century. The courts started
from the existing basic principle: liability required malice,
but would be implied whenever defamatory words were
spoken. They then took the view that a genuine critique of
a work of literature, or a public performance, which
contained defamatory allegations, could be seen as
rebutting that presumption of malice, in the same way that
a genuine critical reference about a servant given by his
master to a potential new employer also rebutted the
presumption. What was, essentially a new defence could be
presented as nothing new, a mere application of established
principle to new facts.
But, although the analysis being used to reach the result
was traditional, the courts were careful to point out that, as
a matter of policy, they were pleased with the outcome.
Thus, for instance, in Tabart v Tipper Lord Ellenborough CJ
commented (at 351-52) that “Fair discussion is essentially
necessary to the truth of history, and the advancement of
science.” Literary, dramatic and other types of criticism
were thereby protected, and, indeed encouraged. That this
was a deliberate policy, not merely a happy case of the
defamation rules getting the right answer, seems clear from
the simultaneous recognition of the defence of fair use in
copyright law (see R Burrell, “Reigning in Copyright Law:
Is Fair Use the Answer?” [2001] Intellectual Property
Quarterly 361).
A further important instance of judicial sympathy and
encouragement could be seen later in the century, in the
decision in Wason v Walter, which recognised that fair and
accurate reports of Parliamentary proceedings should be
protected by qualified privilege. Part of the court’s
reasoning was based on an analogy with the protection
given to reports of judicial proceedings. But, as with the
development of the defence of fair comment, the decision
in Wason v Walter (1868) LR 4 QB 73 was more than a mere
elaboration of the existing principles applied to novel
circumstances. A large part of the reasoning dealt with the
balance of “general good over partial and occasional evil”30
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that would result from permitting publication. This was an
overtly policy-driven, indeed, utilitarian approach. It is also
very tempting to link the decision with the expansion of
the electoral franchise granted a year earlier, in 1867.
But judicial encouragement of press activity was not
undiscriminating, and towards the end of the century
judicial attitudes seemed to be cooling. This coincided
with the appearance of a self-styled “new journalism”,
which T P O’Connor – one of its main exponents – wrote
was distinguished by its “more personal tone” (see T P
O’Connor, “The New Journalism” (1889) 1 The New Review
423). Invoking the historical precedents of Macaulay and
Carlyle, O’Connor went on to justify this method:
“the desire for personal details with regard to public men is
healthy, rational, and should be yielded to. Statesmen are not
ciphers without form or blood or passion. Their utterances and
acts are not pure intellectual secretions. If you want to know
how such and such an act of weakness or folly is intelligible at
some crisis in the history of a politician, you must have
learned something more of the politician than you can get
from the verbatim report of his speeches, or the colourless and
dry language of his public documents.”
These noble reasons, when applied in practice, however,
yielded articles with titles such as “What the Queen Eats” –
R Pound and G Harmsworth, Northcliffe (London, 1959) 82
(listing the titles of articles in the first number of Answers to
Correspondents). In the new style there was obviously greater
potential for defamation than there had been under the old
journalistic conventions. And this greater potential for
defamation was combined with larger circulations, because
the publications championing the new techniques were
deliberately aimed at the large number of newly-literate
readers who had benefited from the 1870 Education Act.
Thus, Newnes’ Tit-Bits, Harmsworth’s Answers to
Correspondents, Stead’s Pall Mall Gazette and O’Connor’s Star,
to give some of the most prominent examples, all began
publication in the 1880s and 1890s. But, as O’Connor
realised, the new techniques were not universally well-
received. Writing in 1889 he observed that:
There has recently grown up in the jury-box a spirit of savage
hatred to journalism which has led to some very unjust
verdicts and some scandalous damages. A portion of the public
actually seem to imagine it is the desire and also the interest
of a certain class of journalists to libel everybody they can. …
of the ordinary respectable journal no conception could be
more incorrect (“The New Journalism” (1889) 1 The New
Review 423 at 430-31).
The feelings of disquiet that O’Connor detected were
not, I would suggest, confined to the jury-box. It seems to
be no coincidence that when the House of Lords, in E
Hulton & Co v Jones [1910] AC 20 introduced strict liability
in defamation, it was in relation to an archetypal product
of the new journalistic style. The House of Lords also
declined to interfere with a very heavy award of damages
against the newspaper concerned. Judicial caution could
also be seen in the Court of Appeal, which introduced a
negligence-based test for distributors in Emmens v Pottle
(1885) 16 QBD 354. That test was stricter than the test
previously had been for such defendants, and Bowen LJ
seemed to have a particular kind of publication in mind
when he said that a distributor would be liable if he knew
that the work in question was “likely” to contain a libel.
Applied literally, Bowen LJ’s test would have gone a long
way towards suppressing those publications that availed
themselves of the techniques of critical journalism, because
no one would have wanted to distribute them. These
decisions were obviously not what the press wanted; indeed,
the decision on distributors’ liability prompted booksellers
to lobby Parliament in the hope of getting the law changed
(see P Mitchell, The Making of the Modern Law of Defamation
(Oxford, 2005) 131). But to no avail. These decisions
continue to define the role of fault in defamation today.
The judicial attitude to defamation as the law of the
press was, therefore, a nuanced and changing one. The
protection for literary and other criticism, and for reports
of Parliamentary proceedings showed a judicial readiness
to give the press a full role in relation to public matters.
The judges seem to have felt that the public sphere was the
proper place for newspaper involvement, and were ready to
adapt the common law to give effect to that view. But the
more personal, private matters discussed by the later
nineteenth century newspapers did not attract the same
kind of judicial sympathy. When such matters were
litigated, the judicial response was to tighten the rules, and
limit the role of fault as a defence.
CONCLUSION
The extent to which the nineteenth century law of
defamation was a law of the press is, therefore, difficult to
encapsulate in simple terms. Large parts of the law
developed entirely without reference to press
considerations. Where reference was made to the press, it
is necessary to separate Parliament and the courts.
Throughout the nineteenth century there clearly was a
Parliamentary appreciation that the content of the law of
defamation should be responsive to the press. But the form
that that response took was never uniform. At one end of
the spectrum is the 1888 Act, which simply gave
journalists what they asked for; at the other was the
introduction of the public benefit requirement in New
South Wales in 1847, which gave journalists precisely what
they had said they did not want.
The 1881 Act, with its general privilege for the reports
of public meetings lay somewhere in between: content
journalists wanted, but in a form they disliked. All three
statutes could legitimately be described as part of the law
“of the press”, but that description tends to hide the very
different relationships between their contents and the
members of the press.
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So far as the courts were concerned, if there is a unifying
theme, it is about encouraging certain kinds of journalism
(such as literary criticism and reports of Parliamentary
proceedings) and discouraging other types by reducing or
eliminating defences based on fault. In general, material
relating to the public sphere seems to have been protected,
whilst matters relating to private life were not. In both
cases – both encouragement and discouragement – the
method used was the exposition of general common law
principle relating to fault standards, which, of course, did
not apply only to press defendants. But, even though it was
not confined to the press, the principles developed by the
courts seem to be appropriately categorised as belonging to
the “law of the press”, because, although they were not
desired by the press, they were a response to the Press, and
an attempt to regulate its practices.
The result of these complex interactions between the
law of defamation and the press was that the nineteenth
century law of defamation was a patchwork. Some of it was
what the journalists wanted, some of it was exactly the
opposite; some of it was responding to their activities,
other parts, such as, for instance, the burden of proof of
truth, had a major effect on journalists, but had been
designed with no reference to them at all. Yet other parts
of the law had no relevance to the press whatsoever:
slander and qualified privilege are two of the most striking
illustrations of that. The nineteenth century law of
defamation, in other words, consisted of a mass of material
in which there was no consistent theme, policy or
assumption about the role of the press in relation to the
content of the law. Different criteria had informed
different legal sources at different times; no single criterion
had prevailed.
The legacy of this complex nineteenth century position
is that today defamation sits rather uncomfortably in media
law. It may indeed be invoked against media defendants
more often than it is invoked against anyone else, but its
rules and principles are derived from a variety of sources,
some of no relevance to the media, others based on
conflicting assumptions about what the media should do.
Nineteenth century defamation law was only partly a law of
the press, in a complex way; twenty-first century
defamation law, having inherited a mass of nineteenth
century rules, inevitably has an equally complex, and
ambiguous, relationship with its media users.
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